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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
McCARTHY V. THOMAS: ARE STATES 
BOUND WHEN APPROVAL OF.AN SIP IS 
MERELY CONDITIONAL? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In McCarthy v. Thomas, l the Ninth Circuit held that the 
Clean Air Act (hereinafter "CAA") authorizes the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (hereinafter "EPA") to conditionally ap-
prove a State Implementation Plan (hereinafter "SIP"), thereby 
binding the states even if later EPA actions do not specifically 
reference the earlier conditionally approved provisions.2 In 
1. McCarthy v. Thomas, 27 F.3d 1363 (9th Cir. 1994) (per Wiggins, C.J., the 
other panel members were Wallace, J., and Garth, C.J., Senior United States Cir-
cuit Judge for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation) 
2. McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1373. State Implementation Plans are mandated 
under the CAA. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1988 & Supp. v 1993). These plans are 
submitted by the individual states to the EPA. See id. § 7410(a)(1). The plans 
document how a state will comply with National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
[hereinafter "NAAQS"J. [d. The measures provided in each plan are decided by the 
individual state and are not dictated by the EPA. See id. § 7410. Under the CAA 
amendments in 1990, SIPs in nonattainment areas must include specific measures 
such as enforceable emission limits, economic incentives, and schedules for reach-
ing compliance. See id. § 7502. The plans must ensure timely compliance with the 
imposed air quality standards. See id. § 7410. In addition, the plans are subjected 
to EPA approval. S!!e id. § 7410(k). If the plans are not approved by the EPA 
then the state may be faced with penalties. See id. § 7413. Earlier revisions of the 
CAA allowed the EPA to impose a moratorium on construction projects in areas 
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McCarthy, the SIP which included transportation measures for 
Pima and Maricopa Counties in Arizona, had never been fully 
approved by the EPA, but had received a conditional approv-
al.3 Since Arizona had difficulty complying with the CAA, the 
SIP was revised several times before the EPA granted full 
approval.4 The final plan, approved years later by the EPA, 
did not specifically include the transportation provisions origi-
nally provided by the state.5 
The McCarthy decision puts the states on notice that com-
mitments made in SIPs are legally binding notwithstanding 
the SIP is only conditionally approved. When a state proposes 
changes to its SIP, it does not get a new "bite of the apple," but 
must adhere to measures already accepted by the EPA.6 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The appellants in McCarthy had sought an order from the 
district court compelling changes to the mass transit systems 
of the cities of Tucson and Phoenix.7 Arizona had proposed the 
transit provisions as part of the original SIP submitted to the 
EPA for Pima and Maricopa counties.s The district court re-
fused to grant the order.9 
1987). The current version of the CAA allows the EPA to cut off federal funding 
to highway projects located in the nonattainment area. See 42 U.S.C. § 7509 
(Supp. V 1993). 
3. McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1365. 
4. See id. at 1367. As discussed in the facts of McCarthy, a number of law 
suits were litigated involving the SIPs for Pima and Maricopa counties. See id. at 
1366. 
5. Id. at 1372. See infra note 7 for a discussion of the mass transit provi-
sions that are being contested in McCarthy. 
6. See McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1373. 
7. McCarthy v. Thomas, 27 F.3d 1363, 1364, 1367 (9th Cir. 1994). The mass 
transit plans were submitted for Pima and Maricopa counties in 1979. Id. at 1365. 
The transit provision for Pima county was to increase the Tucson transit system 
to a fleet of 199 buses which would have required the city to add 59 buses. Id. 
Total ridership goals were also included in the plan which called for a yearly 
ridership of 14.5 million by the year 1986. Id. The plan for Maricopa County 
would have increased the number of buses in Phoenix to 400 with a daily rider-
ship of 112,000. Id. By the time McCarthy was decided, Tucson had a bus fleet of 
168 buses and a yearly ridership of 13.6 million. Id. at 1367. Phoenix had a fleet 
of 369 buses with a daily ridership of 103,000. Id. 
8. See id. at 1365. 
9. Id. at 1367. 
2
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The transit provisions were proposed to help reduce the 
levels of air pollutants in Pima and Maricopa Counties.10 The 
Environmental Protection Agency (hereinafter "EPA") had 
designated these counties as non attainment areas for carbon 
monoxide (hereinafter "CO") in 1978.11 To reduce the CO lev-
els in these counties, Arizona had submitted the transit provi-
sions as one element in their overall control strategy.12 Arizo-
na first submitted the overall plan in 1979, and received condi-
tional approval by the EPA in 1982.13 
The EPA did not grant full approval of the SIP due to 
concerns unrelated to the mass transit provisions.14 Arizona 
took no action to address the EPA's concerns until the EPA 
imposed sanctions limiting construction of new sources of CO 
emissions.15 After failing in an attempt to block the sanctions, 
Arizona responded to the EPA's concerns.16 A revised SIP was 
submitted to the EPA and approved in 1988.17 The EPA ap-
proval was documented in the Federal Register, but the sum-
mary did not refer to the mass transit measures that had been 
approved in 1982.18 
10. See w.. at 1365. . 
11. [d. at 1365. Carbon monoxide i8 one of the criteria pollutants that is con-
trolled under the CAA. See 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(4)(a). For most urban areas a 
m~or source of carbon monoxide comes from automobile emissions. See generally 
WILLIAM H. RoDGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw, Chapter 3 (1994). An area is desig-
nated as being in "nonattainment" when it fails to meet the air emission standard 
for a criteria pollutant. See 42 U.S.C. § 7501(2). 
12. See McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1365. 
13. [d. The EPA denied full approval because of deficiencies in the plan that 
it wanted the state to correct. [d. 
14. [d. The summary of the facts provided in the opinion does not identify the 
deficiencies in the SIP that the EPA wanted corrected. See w.. However, the sum-
mary clearly states that the deficiencies did not concern the provisions for transit 
improvements. See w.. 
15. Arizona v. Thomas, 829 F.2d 834, 835 (9th Cir. 1987). The EPA imposed 
sanctions because it found that the SIP submitted by Arizona did not result in 
timely compliance with the air quality standards for carbon monoxide. See w.. at 
835. Arizona had argued that the EPA should have allowed it to revise its plan 
prior to imposing the sanctions. [d. The court held that because one of the goals of 
the CAA was timely compliance, the actions of the EPA were not "arbitrary or 
capricious". [d. at 840. 
16. See McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1366. 
17. [d. at 1366 (citing 53 Fed. Reg. 30220, 30224 (1988». 
18. [d. (citing 56 Fed. Reg. 3219, 3220 (1991». All proposed rulemaking and 
other pending decisions of the EPA are listed in the federal register prior to final 
approval. See generally PERCIVAL et aI., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION LAw, SCI-
3
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The approved SIP was challenged in Delaney v. Environ-
mental Protection Agency. 19 The citizen plaintiffs in Delaney 
petitioned the court to vacate the SIP for Pima and Maricopa 
counties.20 The plaintiffs alleged that the EPA actions were 
unreasonable since the SIP did not meet the CAA's statutory 
deadlines for compliance.21 The Ninth Circuit upheld the chal-
lenge and vacated the final EPA ruling that had approved the 
Arizona SIP.22 
In response to the Ninth Circuit decision in Delaney v. 
Environmental Protection Agency, the EPA issued a Federal 
Implementation Plan (hereinafter "FIP,,).23 The FIP covered 
Pima and Maricopa counties, and incorporated by reference all 
of the provisions that had been included in the SIP vacated by 
the Ninth Circuit decision.24 
The mass transit provisions that were originally proposed 
In 1979 had never been fully implemented.25 As a result, the 
ENCE, AND POLICY, Chapter Five (1992). This is done so that interested parties 
will have the opportunity to comment on proposed actions. See id. In addition it 
informs interested parties of actions that have been approved by the EPA. See id. 
19. Delaney v. EPA, 898 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1990). The Delaney court reviewed 
the control provisions in the SIP aimed at lowering CO levels in Maricopa and 
Pima counties. See id. at 691·95. The Delaney plaintiffs argued that additional 
control measures were needed in the SIP to accelerate the attainment of CO emis· 
sions. See id. at 692. 
20. ld. at 688. 
21. ld. at 689·90. The 1977 amendments to the CAA required states to be in 
compliance with air quality standards by 1982. ld. Arizona had failed to meet this 
date for CO levels for Pima and Maricopa counties. See generally id. at 689·91. 
The Delaney court held that Congress's intent was that states not in compliance 
with the CAA must meet the standards as soon as possible. ld. at 691. For a 
good discussion of the problems involved in bringing nonattainment areas into 
compliance with the CAA, see generally RODGERS, supra note 11, at 210·22. 
22. ld. at 694. 
23. McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1367 (citing 56 Fed. Reg. 5458, 5459 (1991)). Under 
the provisions of the CAA the EPA has the ultimate responsibility to see that 
states meet the guidelines of the act. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1990). If the state 
plans fail to meet the statutory guidelines then the EPA is required to promulgate 
an FIP. See id. § 741O(c)(1). The Ninth Circuit held that the plan provided by 
Arizona did not comply with the CAA. Delaney, 898 F.2d at 695. As a result the 
EPA was required by the act to generate an FIP for the state. ld. 
24. McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1366. 
25. ld. at 1367. To meet the original transit goals, Tucson needed to add an 
additional 31 busses to its fleet, and increase yearly ridership by one million pas· 
sengers. See id. at 1365, 1367. Phoenix also needed to increase its fleet by 31 
busses and increase ridership by 9,000 passengers a day to meet its goal. See id. 
4
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McCarthy appellants filed a lawsuit in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Arizona, seeking an injunction 
against the cities of Tucson and Phoenix.26 The district court 
dismissed the suit, ruling that the mass transit provisions 
were not enforceable since they were not part of a final ap-
proved plan.27 
The citizens appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.28 The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's deci-
sion, but did not impose the injunction sought by the appel-
lants.29 Instead, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the 
district court to fashion the final remedy.30 
The McCarthy court held that the EPA's conditional ap-
proval of the SIP was binding and thus, the state was respon-
sible for the transportation control measures.31 The court rea-
soned that enforcement of the measures set forth in the earlier 
conditionally approved revision of the SIP was not dependent 
on whether the transportation control measures were included 
in the final approved plan.32 The fact that these measures 
were never deleted was sufficient to put the state on notice 
that the state was still responsible for their implementation.33 
Furthermore, the court held that changing the party responsi-
ble for the SIP from the state to the EPA, by imposing an FIP, 
26. Id. at 1367. 
27. Id. The district court ruled that the earlier provisions were not binding 
since the EPA's plan in 1991 did not specifically reference them. Id. The district 
court reasoned that "final" approval meant that the plan would not require any 
further revision. Id. Therefore, since the plan submitted in 1982 was acknowledged 
to require further revision it could not be defined as final. See id. In the alterna-
tive, the district court reasoned that even if the mass transit provisions submitted 
in 1982 were enforceable, the Ninth Circuit subsequently vacated the plan. See id. 
at 1370. Therefore, the district court held that once the plan was vacated, the 
mass transit provisions would need to be re-submitted and approved to be enforce-
able. Id. 
28. See Id. at 1367. 
29. McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1373. The decision to remand without requiring the 
state to comply with the provisions may have been to allow the parties to work 
out other possible settlements. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. See id. at 1370. See generally RODGERS, supra note 11, at Chapter Three 
for a discussion of the EPA approval process for SIPs. 
33. See id. at 1370 n.2. . 
5
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did not relieve the state of its earlier commitments.34 
III. THE CLEAN AIR ACT: BACKGROUND 
The Clean Air Act was first enacted in 1963, making it one 
of the earliest environmental statutes.35 Since 1963, the CAA 
has been revised on several occasions, each revision has at-
tempted to provide more comprehensive controls for reducing 
air pollution.36 The 1990 amendments made significant chang-
es to the statute, and clarified the EPA's authority to condi-
tionally approve SIPs.37 
A. 1990 CAA AMENDMENTS: IMPACT ON CONDITIONAL 
AFPROV AL OF SIPs 
Prior to the 1990 amendments, a number of lawsuits were 
litigated regarding the authority of the EPA to review and 
approve SIPs.38 Two common questions involved the extent of 
public participation required for SIP reviews, and the possibili-
ty that SIPs could be subdivided with only parts being ap-
proved.39 The concern in these suits, as echoed in McCarthy v. 
Thomas, was that piecemeal approval may result in the avoid-
ance of stricter procedural requirements.4O 
However, the EPA's power to approve portions of SIPs 
with provisions pending appears to have been cemented 
through the 1990 CAA amendments.41 A basis suggested for 
34. See id. 
35. See generally WILLIAM H. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw, Chapter Three 
(1994). The CAA was preceded by the Air Pollution Control Act of 1955. See id. at 
130. However, the Air Pollution Control Act left most of the responsibility for air 
pollution control with the states. ld. 
36. See generally id. at Chapter 3 for a thorough overview of the 1990 CAA 
amendments. 
37. See generally id. at 196-214. 
38. See generally WILLIAM H. RoDGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw, at 196-202 
(1994) .. 
39. See generally id. 
40. See id. at 201 n.32 (citing Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Gorsuch, 742 F.2d 
1028 (7th Cir. 1984». The court disallowed the EPA to let states avoid stricter 
procedures by calling their action a partial approval. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 742 
F.2d at 1035. 
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(3)-(4). These provisions give the EPA authorization 
6
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allowing this type of piecemeal approval was to protect the 
EPA's administrative discretion.42 Since the SIP consists of 
many diverse elements, the EPA needs the ability to approve 
portions of plans that promote improved air quality.43 The 
McCarthy court's analysis interprets provisions of the CAA 
that had been in effect prior to the 1990 amendments.44 
B. GoALS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 
The CAA is structured to address pollutants which pose 
significant risks to human health and the environment.45 
These "top offenders" are defined in the CAA as "criteria pol-
lutants."46 The CAA required the EPA to develop a list of 
these pollutants by January 30, 1971.47 Initially, the EPA list-
ed five types of substances as criteria pollutants: sulfur oxides, 
particulates, carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons, and photochemi-
cal oxidants.48 Since that time, only lead and nitrogen oxides 
have been added to the list while hydrocarbons have been 
removed from the list. 
The criteria pollutants are controlled through the use of 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (hereinafter 
"NAAQS,,).49 NAAQS are uniform emission limitations set by 
the EPA for each of the criteria pollutants.50 
for partial and conditional approvals of SIPs. See id. 
42. See RODGERS, supra note 35, at 202. 
43. See id. at 202. 
44. See McCarthy v. Thomas, 27 F.3d 1363, 1368 (9th Cir. 1994). 
45. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1). 
47. See id. § 7408. Currently the substances included on the list are: sulfur 
oxides, particulates, carbon monoxide, photochemical oxidants, nitrogen oxides, and 
lead. See PERCIVAL et. al., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION LAw, SCIENCE AND POI.JCY, 
at 771 (1992). 
48. RODGERS supra, note 35 at 156-61. The first five criteria pollutants were 
sulfur oxides, particulates, carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons, and photochemical oxi-
dants. [d. Nitrogen oxides were added to the list by the EPA in 1971. [d. Lead 
was also added to the list in 1978 due to litigation. [d. Subsequently hydrocarbons 
have been dropped from the list of criteria pollutants. [d. 
49. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409. 
50. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a) and (b). NAAQS consist of a primary air quality stan-
dard and a secondary air quality standard for each criteria pollutant. See id. The 
primary standards are set to allow an adequate margin of safety requisite to pro-
tect the public health. See id. The secondary ambient air quality standards specify 
7
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In broad terms, the SIPs are a vehicle for "implementa-
tion, maintenance, and enforcement" of the NAAQS for each 
state.51 The SIP requirements are set forth in Section 
7410(a)(2) of the CAA, with the major elements as follows: 
enforceable emission limitations for the criteria pollutants; 
programs to monitor ambient air quality; programs to enforce 
emission limitations; programs to control source emissions; and 
evidence of adequate state funding and authority to implement 
the plan.52 
The EPA reviews and approves SIPs prepared by the state 
to ensure that the SIP complies with the CAA.53 If the EPA 
finds that the SIP is inadequate, the EPA has different en-
forcement options available under the CAA.54 
C. ENFORCEMENT OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 
Initial responsibility for enforcement of the CAA is left to 
each state.55 Each state develops an SIP showing how it will 
achieve and maintain the ambient air quality standards for 
every quality control region in the state. 56 Each SIP must in-
clude a demonstration of not only how the air quality limits 
will be reached, but how the limits will be maintained. 57 
The SIP is submitted to the EPA for approval, and once 
approved by the EPA, the SIP is binding upon the state.58 A 
a level of air quality to protect the public welfare from any known or anticipated 
adverse affects. See id. 
51. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1). Under section 7407 of the CAA, each state is divid-
ed up into air quality control regions. See 42 U.S.C. § 7407. Air quality control 
regions were first required under the Air Quality Act of 1967. See RODGERS supra 
note 35, at 131. An air quality region is defined by both scientific factors, such as 
meteorological characteristics, as well as political factors. [d. The EPA has identi-
fied 247 air quality control regions in the United States. [d. A specific air quality 
region could have different designations for each criteria pollutant. [d. at 132. As 
an example, the area could be designated as an attainment area for nitrogen ox-
ides while being a non-attainment for carbon monoxide. See id. 
52. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2). 
53. See id. at § 7410(k). 
54. [d. at § 7411(m) and § 7413. 
55. See id. § 7410 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
56. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1). 
57. See id. § 7410(a)(2). 
58. See [d. 
8
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state's failure to comply with the provisions of the SIP may 
result in the imposition of sanctions by the EPA.59 In addi-
tion, citizen suits may be filed against the state or the EPA 
administrator for failure to enforce the provisions of the 
CAA.60 
The EPA, upon initial review, may reject the plan present-
ed by the state as· inadequate to meet the requirements of the 
statute.61 Upon rejection, the plan is returned to the state for 
revision.62 Once the state is delinquent in submitting the orig-
inal or the revised SIP, the EPA is required to generate a Fed-
eral Implementation Plan.63 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit reviewed existing case law and held 
that statutory interpretations by federal agencies, if reason-
able, should receive deferrence.64 
A. THE CLEAN AIR ACT ALLOWS CONDITIONAL APPROVAL OF 
SIPs 
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by reviewing the 
decision reached by the district court.65 The district court 
ruled that provisions of a state or federal plan are not enforce-
able until specifically included in a final approved plan.66 The 
59. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(m) and § 7413. These sections discuss federal enforce-
ment of the CAA. See id. 
60. 42 U.S.C. § 7604. This provision applies to any failure by the EPA in 
enforcing the CAA. See generally RODGERS, supra note 37, at Chapter 3. For ex-
ample, a citizen suit may be brought against the EPA for improperly approving a 
SIP or against the state for not implementing its SIP. Id. When brought against 
the state, the citizen suit is acting for the EPA which has failed to perform their 
administrative duties. Id. 
61. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k). This section of the CAA outlines the EPA review 
of a SIP. Id. 
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(5). 
63. See id. § 741O(c). The FIP is written to deal with those portions of the 
SIP found to be inadequate. Id. In the present case, a FIP was written only to 
deal with CO levels for Pima and Maricopa counties. McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1367. 
64. McCarthy v. Thomas, 27 F.3d 1363, 1368-70 (9th Cir. 1994). 
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use of conditional approval was merely a shorthand method 
indicating that final approval would be forthcoming when re-
maining conditions were met.67 
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that this approach would be 
potentially counter-productive to the statutory process of en-
suring compliance with the Clean Air Act.68 The Ninth Circuit 
reasoned that the Environmental Protection Agency routinely 
receives numerous revisions to implementation plans.69 By 
following the district court's ruling, and not combining mea-
sures from earlier plans, Arizona would still fail to comply 
with the CAA.70 Under the district court's reasoning, no ver-
sion of the plan, even that accepted by the district court, in-
cluded enough measures to meet air quality standards for 
carbon monoxide. 71 
B. THE EPA CAN APPROVE SIPs THAT ARE SUBSTANTIALLY 
COMPLETE 
In reviewing previous Ninth Circuit cases interpreting the 
provisions of the CAA regarding EPA approval of State Imple-
mentation Plans, the Ninth Circuit found that Kamp v. 
Hernandez was controlling. 72 
In Kamp, the Ninth Circuit held that an SIP may receive 
EPA approval even if it does not fully comply with the CAA.73 
67. See id. at 1368. 
68. Id. at 1370. 
69. See id. at 1369-70. In the fact section of the opinion, the Ninth Circuit 
outlines the involved proceedings that have occurred in developing the implementa-
tion plan for Arizona. See id. at 1365. 
70. Id. at 1370. The district court did find that a final plan existed for com-
plying with the air quality standards of the CAA. See id. at 1367. The EPA ar-
gued that the plan referenced by the district court was itself incomplete. See id. 
at 1370. This plan also relied on other provisions which were not explicitly con-
tained in the plan. Id. Using the logic of the district court, no final approved plan 
would exist for Arizona. Id. 
71. See id. at 1370. 
72. Id. at 1368 (citing Kamp v. Hernandez, 752 F.2d 1444 (9th Cir. 1985». 
73. See Kamp, 752 F.2d at 1455. Kamp involved the EPA's approval of SIPs 
submitted by Arizona to limit sulfur dioxide emissions from copper smelters. See 
Id. at 1446. The EPA's approval of the plan was challenged by a resident of Ari-
zona. Id. One of the contentions raised by the resident was that the plan ap-
proved by the EPA was not final. See id. at 1449. The plan did not account for 
10
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An SIP's absolute compliance with Section 7410(a)(2) of the 
CAA is not required before the EPA can confirm the SIP. 74 
The EPA can approve a substantially complete implementation 
plan if the state provides the EPA assurances that the plan 
will be promptly finished. 75 The Kamp court added that the 
EPA could not consider the plan substantially complete if the 
plan circumvented the requirements of the CAA.76 
In comparing Kamp to McCarthy, the Ninth Circuit found 
that both plans were substantially complete.77 Whether the 
EPA approved the plan as final with actions pending, as in 
Kamp, or conditionally approved with actions pending, as in 
McCarthy, was irrelevant.1s In either case, the plans would be 
equally enforceable.79 The Ninth Circuit held that the plan 
submitted in 1982 by Arizona was "substantially complete."so 
Applying the holding in Kamp, the Ninth Circuit found that 
the mass transit provisions were part of an enforceable plan 
and were binding on the cities.s1 
sulfur dioxide emissions that escape during the smeltering process. See id. at 
1453. The plan did require that Arizona study and submit revised measures to 
show how these emissions would be controlled. See id. at 1449. The court found 
this type of contingent or "conditional" approval to be allowed by the CAA. [d. at 
1454. 
74. [d. at 1455. This section of the CAA provides the elements that each state 
must include within its SIP. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
75. See Kamp, 752 F.2d at 1453-54. 
76. See id. at 1455. The Kamp court did not define what made a plan sub-
stantially complete. The author believes from the holding in Kamp that this deci-
sion would depend on the facts of the particular case. Per the 1990 amendments 
to the CAA, the EPA can conditionally approve a plan if the state commits to 
adopt specific enforceable measures by a certain date. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(4). 
77. McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1368. The court looked to the conditional approval 
that the EPA made in 1982. See id. at 1368. The deficiencies that the EPA had 
found in the plan were deemed to be minor by the court. [d. at 1368. The Ninth 
Circuit in Kamp held that the EPA could approve plans that were substantially 
complete. Kamp, 752 F.2d at 1455. Since the deficiencies in McCarthy were 
deemed as minor, the EPA approval was binding on the state. See McCarthy, 27 
F.3d at 1369. Calling the approval conditional did not impact its effect on the 
state. [d. 
78. McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1369. 
79. [d. 
80. [d. at 1368-69. 
8l. McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1369. The court's holding in Kamp was that the 
EPA has the authority to approved SIPs that are substantially complete. Kamp, 
752 F.2d at 1455. 
11
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C. AGENCY READING OF STATUTE NEED MERELY BE 
REASONABLE AND NEED NOT CONSTITUTE THE ONLY 
INTERPRETATION 
The Ninth Circuit analyzed the reasonableness of the 
EPA's view that the CAA authorized the EPA to conditionally 
approve SIPs.82 The court looked at the agency's action in 
light of the pre-1990 provisions of the CAA, which allowed the 
EPA to approve any "submitted plan or portion thereof.,,83 The 
Ninth Circuit concurred with the EPA's interpretation that 
ratifying a portion of a plan would be meaningless unless the 
endorsed portion was binding.84 Pursuant to this interpreta-
tion, the Ninth Circuit held that the portion of the plan that is 
confirmed by the EPA becomes binding on the date it is ap-
proved.85 The court found that endorsing measures which par-
tially ensure compliance in non attainment areas was similar to 
approving a portion of a plan.86 Therefore, the court found 
that the EPA had authority under the CAA to ratify provisions 
of a plan even if the plan as a whole was incomplete.87 
The court found an alternate basis· allowing conditional 
approvals of SIPs in Section 7410(c)(1) of the CAA, which de-
fines when the EPA must issue a Federal Implementation Plan 
(hereinafter "FIP,,).88 A state can stop the EPA from issuing 
82. McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1368. 
83. 1d. at 1369 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2) (1988)). 
The CAA underwent major revisions in ·1990. See generally RODGERS, supra note 
35, at Chapter 3. The 1990 amendments to the CAA clarified the EPA's authority 
to either partially or conditionally approve plans. See McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1369 
(citing, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(4». The SIPs litigated in 
McCarthy were prepared prior to the 1990 amendments to the CAA. See id. at 
1365-67. 
84. McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1369. 
85. See id. The court stated that conditional measures become part of the final 
plan when the EPA approves the measures. 1d. 
86. McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1369. 
87. See id. The court viewed the CAA as allowing the EPA to approve imple-
mentation plans incrementally. 1d. 
88. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(l) (1988)). As discussed in the back-
ground section of this summary, the state is the party responsible for implement-
ing measures in the SIP to meet NAAQS. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 
1993). The EPA is required to issue a FIP only if the state fails to submit a plan 
that the EPA can approve. See 42 U.S.C. § 741O(c). The state can stop the EPA 
from issuing a FIP if it corrects its plan. 1d. The state can submit corrections up 
till the time that the EPA issues its FIP. 1d. When that occurs, the FIP is bind-
12
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an FIP if the state corrects the deficiencies in the plan.89 The 
Ninth Circuit interpreted Section 7410(c)(1) as allowing the 
EPA to confirm a plan with conditions, prior to granting full 
approval.90 This reading of the CAA was viewed as reasonable 
by the court since the CAA already allowed the EPA to ap-
prove portions of plans.91 
In McCarthy, the EPA acted to endorse mass transit provi-
sions to help achieve air quality standards for CO.92 At the 
same time, the EPA stayed final approval until additional 
control measures were added.93 The EPA had noted only mi-
nor deficiencies in their action, confirming the SIP for Pima 
and Maricopa counties.94 The Ninth Circuit deemed that the 
EPA's actions were a reasonable interpretation of the CAA.95 
In reaching this decision, the Ninth Circuit stated that the 
reading of the statute by the EPA need merely be reasonable 
and need not constitute the only interpretation.96 
The court then summarized actions taken by the EPA in 
the present case.97 The EPA was provided with a plan for 
Maricopa and Pima counties to help those counties meet air 
quality standards by increasing mass transit in Tucson and 
Phoenix.98 These measures, approved by the EPA in the "no-
tice of final rulemaking" published in the Federal Register in 
1982, were to take effect with full approval pending.99 The 
Ninth Circuit found that these actions were reasonable and 
fully consistent with the interpretation of the CAA made by 
the EPA lOO The Ninth Circuit therefore held that the agency 
ing on the state. [d. 
89. McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1369 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1) (1988». 
90. [d. 
91. See id. In addition the court noted that this incremental approach would 
help ensure that NMQS would be met expeditiously as required by the CM. [d. 
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 7502(a) (1988». 
92. [d. at 1365. 
93. [d. 
94. See McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1368. 
95. [d. at 1369·70. 
96. See id. at 1369 (citing City of Seabrook v. EPA, 659 F.2d 1349, 1356 (5th 
Cir. 1981)). 
97. McCarthy, 27 F.2d at 1369. 
98. [d. (citing 47 Fed. Reg. 19328, 29534 (1982». 
99. [d. at 1365 (citing 47 Fed. Reg. 29532·29534 and 47 Fed. Reg. 19326·28 
(1982». 
100. [d. at 1369, 1370 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
13
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action should be given deference. lol 
D. PIMA AND MARICOPA COUNTIES ARGUMENT 
The cities' first argument relied on the decision of the 
Ninth Circuit in Delaney v. Environmental Protection Agen-
cy.102 In Delaney, concerned citizens attacked the EPA's ap-
proval of the SIPs for Pima and Maricopa counties. loa The ap-
pellants in Delaney argued that the SIPs approved by the EPA 
did not include adequate control measures for CO.104 In its 
analysis, the court listed the particular pollution control mea-
sures for CO that were included in the SIPs. lo5 The Delaney 
court also noted that specific recommendations to expand mass 
transit in Maricopa and Pima counties had been rejected by 
the state. lOG The cities relied on the statements in Delaney to 
show that mass transit improvements were not part of the 
approved SIPs for Pima and Maricopa counties. 107 
However, the Ninth Circuit distinguished the mass transit 
measures discussed in Delaney from those in McCarthy.lOs 
The Ninth Circuit stated that the mass transit measures refer-
enced in Delaney were additional measures that the state had 
considered. lo9 Therefore, the rejection of these later provi-
Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984». 
101. 1d. at 1370. In Chevron the Court had adopted a two part test for review-
ing agency decisions. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. See generally PERCIVAL et aI., 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION LAw, SCIENCE, AND POLICY, 746-54 (1992) for a dis-
cussion of the Chevron holding. The first part of the Chevron test looked to the 
statute to determine if it were clear on its face. See id. If the statute was not 
ambiguous, agency decisions were to be given deference unless they were found to 
be an abuse of discretion. See id. 
102. McCarthy v. Thomas, 27 F.3d 1363, 1371 (citing Delaney v. EPA, 898 F.2d 
687 (9th Cir. 1990». 
103. See Delaney, 898 F.2d at 692. 
104. 1d. at 691-92. 
105. 1d. at 691. The court listed three control measures as being included in 
the EPA approved SIPs for Pima and Maricopa counties: 1) gas stations must sell 
only oxygenated fuels in the winter when CO levels are the highest; 2) large em-
ployers must encourage car pooling; and 3) automobile inspections must test car 
emissions while under load and at idle. 1d. 
106. See id. at 692. 
107. McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1371 (citing Delaney, 898 F.2d at 691). 
108. 1d. 
109. See id. at 1370. The mass transit measures discussed in Delaney came 
from studies done in 1987 and 1988. See Delaney, 898 F.2d at 691. The mass 
14
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sions had no impact on the earlier mass transit prOVISIOns 
approved by the EP A. 110 
The City of Tucson asserted that the mass transit provi-
sions were not valid, based on the Ninth Circuit's decision in 
Arizona v. Thomas.l11 The Arizona court found that the SIPs 
for Pima and Maricopa counties were inadequate, and upheld 
the imposition of sanctions by the EPA against Arizona.112 
Tucson argued that if an SIP was judged to be inadequate, all 
previous provisions included in those plans were voided. 113 
However, the court stated that Tucson applied too "expansive" 
a reading to the holding in Arizona.114 The decision reached 
in Arizona only upheld the EPA's determination that the SIP 
for Pima and Maricopa counties would not achieve air quality 
standards in a timely manner.115 The EPA's use of sanctions 
was, therefore, upheld by the court in that case.116 The deci-
sion in Arizona, according to the Ninth Circuit, did not disturb 
any prior control measures approved by the EPA. ll7 
Finally, Tucson relied on California ex rel. California Air 
Resources Bd. v. EPA118 to support the proposition that disap-
proved or deleted provisions of a state implementation plan are 
not enforceable.119 In California Air Resources Board, Nevada 
and California both had SIPs that included the Lake Tahoe 
transit improvements were not the same as the ones committed to in 1979. Mc· 
Carthy, 27 F.3d at 1371. 
110. [d. at 1371. 
111. [d. (citing Arizona v. Thomas, 829 F.2d 834 (9th Cir. 1987». Arizona chal-
lenged the EPA's right to impose bans on construction of new sources of CO. Ari-
zona, 829 F.2d at 835. These sanctions were imposed by the EPA after a finding 
that the Arizona SIP was inadequate. [d. Arizona argued that the EPA should 
have allowed Arizona a chance to revise the SIPs prior to imposing the sanctions. 
See id. at 837-38. Arizona based this argument on the fact that the EPA had 
conditionally approved the SIPs. [d. at 838. The court held that the Arizona SIPs 
were inadequate, and allowed the EPA to impose the sanctions. See id. at 840. 
112. See Arizona, 829 F.2d at 840. 
113. McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1371. 
114. [d. at 1371. 
115. [d. 
116. Arizona, 829 F.2d at 840. 
117. McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1371. 
118. California ex reI. California Air Resources Bd. v. EPA, 774 F.2d 1437 (9th 
Cir. 1985). 
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Basin area which borders the two states.120 The states were 
in court challenging the adequacy of each other's SIP for this 
region.121 The California Air Resources Board court held that 
a state does not have to include all pollution control measures 
from an earlier plan in future revisions. 122 The McCarthy 
court distinguished California Air Resources Board by noting 
that the mass transit measures proposed by Maricopa and 
Pima counties had never been deleted.123 Therefore, Tucson's 
reliance on California Air Resources Board was misguided. 124 
In addition to Tucson's arguments, the City of Phoenix 
raised two additional challenges.125 The first was that the 
mass transit provisions of 1982 were invalid since they did not 
comply with the CAA.126 Phoenix argued that the CAA re-
quired that measures submitted in implementation plans be 
backed up by written evidence.127 The written evidence would 
include information showing local government support for the 
measures, and a timetable and schedule for compliance. 128 
The city reasoned that because the transit measures approved 
by the EPA in 1982 failed to meet this requirement, they were 
never enforceable.129 The court dismissed this argument as 
being untimely because Phoenix had sixty days to object to the 
EPA approval after it was granted in 1982.130 By failing to 
120. California Air Resources Bd., 774 F.2d 1437. The EPA had approved the 
SIPs for both California and Nevada that included the Lake Tahoe Basin. Id. at 
1439. Both states were challenging the EPA's approval of the other's SIP for this 
region. Id. Each state was contesting that the other state's SIP was inadequate to 
meet the air quality standards for the Lake Tahoe Basin. See id. at 1440 and 
1442. The court upheld the EPA's approval of both state's SIPs. See id. at 1443. 
121. California Air Resources Board, 774 F.2d at 1439. 
122. See McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1372. The decision in California Air Resources 
Board was that a state should be allowed the flexibility to experiment with its 
pollution control measures. See California Air Resources Board, 774 F.2d at 1442. 
Such experimentation may mean that certain measures once thought to be benefi-
cial are dropped, and replaced with new measures. Id. 
123. McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1371. 
124. See Id. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 1372. Phoenix' argument attacked the EPA conditional approval of 
the SIP more on procedural than substantive grounds. Id. 
127. McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1372. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. See generally PERCIVAL, supra note 101 at Chapter 5 for an overview of 
the administrative process for approval of agency regulations. 
16
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object, Phoenix waived the right to challenge that approv-
al. 131 
Phoenix' second argument questioned the court's interpre-
tation of the CAA, claiming that the court's reading would 
place a significant burden on states when challenging agency 
action.132 Phoenix argued that the court's view would require 
an extended search of past EPA approvals to determine the 
current enforceable pollution control measures. 133 The Ninth 
Circuit indicated that Phoenix overstated the difficulty of this 
task because this information could be found by looking at the 
Code of Federal Regulations and the Federal Register. 134 Al-
so, the court reasoned that the state could look to its own files 
to determine what provisions were submitted to the EPA.135 
E. THE COURT'S HOLDING: EPA's CONDITIONAL APPROVAL OF 
AN SIP Is BINDING AND DOES NOT RESULT IN THE 
DELETION OF THE TRANSPORTATION PROVISIONS FROM THE 
SIP 
The Ninth Circuit analyzed the issues raised and held that 
the district court's ruling was based on an incorrect prem-
ise. 136 The court found that measures approved conditionally 
by the EPA are binding on the state.137 These measures re-
main in later plans without requiring the EPA to specifically 
reference them. in later notices of final approval. 138 The mass 
transit measures were enforceable when incorporated into the 
SIP in 1982, and since the provisions were never deleted, are 
still enforceable. 139 
131. McCarthy, 27 F.3d at 1372. 
132. See id. Phoenix' claim was that the EPA's record made it difficult to track 
current enforceable measures. See id. 
133. 1d. 
134. 1d. at 1372-73. 
135. 1d. 
136. McCarthy v. Thomas, 27 F.3d 1363, 1373 (9th Cir. 1994). The district 
court did not view the mass transit provisions as being part of any plan receiving 
final approval by the EPA. 1d. 
137. 1d. at 1373. 
138. 1d. 
139. 1d. Although the court found that the provisions were still enforceable, the 
court stopped short of forcing the cities to comply with the measures. See id. In-
stead the court remanded the case to the district court to determine the final 
17
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V. CONCLUSION 
The Clean Air Act has broad and ambitio~s goals to pro-
tect the public health and welfare. 14o However, its implemen-
tation has taken many years, ignited much litigation, and its 
goals have still not been fully achieved. 141 Each state is giv-
en the opportunity to devise its own plan for reaching these 
goals. 142 However, full compliance with the CAA requires 
some tough policy decisions and sacrifices on the part of the 
state that may impact economic growth. After twenty years, 
many states remain without acceptable plans in place to cope 
with air pollution.143 
In McCarthy, the Ninth Circuit was unsympathetic to 
Arizona's plea that it was unfair to hold it hostage to provi-
sions submitted years in the past.144 A state's decision. to 
commit to provisions to help lower air pollution binds the state 
to these measures until they are complete. 145 
The Ninth Circuit's decision puts the states on notice that 
the court will not permit them to circumvent standards for 
controlling air pollution. A state cannot claim that each time it 
submits a new plan to the Environmental Protection Agency 
(hereinafter "EPA") the slate is wiped clean, and all previous 
plans are no longer applicable. This interpretation grants the 
state too much discretion, and would thwart Congress and the 
EPA in achieving the ever elusive goals of the CAA. 
Edward P. Murphy' 
remedy. ld. The author believes that this was most likely done to allow the state 
the opportunity to reach a settlement with the citizen group. 
140. See generally WILLIAM H. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw, Chapter Three 
(1994). 
141. See generally PERCIVAL et aI., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION LAw, SCIENCE, 
AND POLICY, Chapter Six (1992). 
142. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). This section outlines the 
steps that a state must consider in preparing its plan for complying with the 
CAA. See id. 
143. See generally RODGERS, supra note 140, at Chapter Three. This chapter 
has a thorough discussion of the various policy decisions and economic impacts of 
compliance with the CAA. See id. 
144. See McCarthy v. Thomas, 27 F.3d 1363, 1373 (9th Cir. 1994). 
145. ld. 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1995. 
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